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THE COMPLEX IMPLICATIONS OF
FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION
HEATHER HUGHES*
I
INTRODUCTION
Emerging financial technologies, or “fintech,” such as cryptocurrencies,
online mobile banking, crowd funding, blockchain-based transaction platforms,
and the like, have potential to expand financial inclusion.1 They can create access
to banking services, investment possibilities, and capital for those currently
underserved in these regards.2 At the same time, new technologies have the
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1. In keeping with the definitional guidelines of this symposium, “financial inclusion” means
widespread deposit-account ownership and access to payments services. Steven L. Schwarcz & Theodore
L. Leonhardt, Scoping and Defining Financial Inclusion, Access to Credit, and Sustainable Finance, 84
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 1, 5. Relatedly, “access to credit” means availability of
adequate loan funding on reasonable terms, especially for aspiring entrepreneurs from underserved
groups. Id. at 9. “Sustainable finance” means continuously providing financial inclusion and access to
credit. Id. at 10.
2. Recent scholarship discusses the potential, but also concerns, for financial inclusion that fintech
platforms present, including concerns about biased algorithms that produce discriminatory results and
about data privacy. See generally Matthew Aaron Chou, Note: What’s in the “Black Box”? Balancing
Financial Inclusion and Privacy in Digital Consumer Lending, 69 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2020); Adam
Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3
(2018); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54
(2019) (noting the tension between Artificial Intelligence and civil rights); Lauren Kirchner, When
Discrimination Is Baked Into Algorithms, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-impact/403969
[https://perma.cc/V4JG3RMW]; Lizzie R. Hobbs, Facebook’s Libra: The Social Media Giant’s Pursuit of Global Financial
Inclusion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 331 (2020); A. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, LEORA KLAPPER, DOROTHE
SINGER, SANIYA ANSAR & JAKE HESS, WORLD BANK GRP., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017:
MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH REVOLUTION 4 (2018), https://
globalfindex.worldbank.org [https://perma.cc/B49W-7ZYU]; DOUGLAS W. ARNER, ROSS P. BUCKLEY
& DIRK A. ZETZSCHE, ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION (2018), https://www.afi-global.org/sites/
default/files/publications/2018-09/AFI_FinTech_Special%20Report_AW_digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z3X3-2UG5]; Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing,
and Alternative Information 1, 7-17 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017) https://
www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q77H-QLKT] (noting the potential for alternative data to improve financial
inclusion); Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currency: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Patrick
Murck, General Counsel, Bitcoin Foundation), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=4cd1ff12312d-429f-aa41-1d77034ec5a8 [https://perma.cc/K28L-WPQ8] (“We believe Bitcoin holds out a number
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potential to aggravate systemic risk.3 For individuals and small businesses, the
possibilities that emerging fintech platforms create are exciting.4 But, from a
macro perspective, what are the implications for financial inclusion and
sustainability of systemic risks that fintech may compound?
This Article builds upon recent scholarship on fintech, systemic risk, and
financial regulation by (i) discussing two ways in which blockchain-based market
activity may elevate systemic risk; (ii) contending that increased systemic risk
threatens financial inclusion and sustainability; and (iii) arguing that, as
blockchain-based financial activity evolves, we should not overlook the
regulatory potential of private-law doctrines and concepts. Other scholars have
articulated how fintech is poised to undermine the power dynamic between
public and private actors that originated with the New Deal, presenting a grave
public policy challenge.5 In engaging this public policy challenge, along with
considering top-down regulatory options, lawmakers should articulate how
blockchain-based transactions comport with contract, property, and entity laws.
Failure to do so could aggravate fintech’s effects on systemic risk. Market
practices could proliferate despite incoherent or inconsistent legal grounding,
making it difficult for regulators to enforce longstanding norms that private-law
rules embody.
Commentators speculate that extensive market activity will transpire on
blockchain-enabled platforms. This Article does not take a position on whether
this is true or how soon developments will materialize. The purpose, here, is to
consider implications of fintech, given possibilities that technology presents.
Blockchain-based financial activity has the potential to compound risks to
market stability. First, it facilitates synthesizing financial assets into obtuse
financial products, the trading of which can escalate in volume and speed
seemingly without limit.6 Second, it enables self-executing transactions that may

of powerfully beneficial social and economic outcomes, including global financial inclusion, enhanced
personal liberty and dignity, improved financial privacy, and a stable money supply for people in
countries where monetary instability may threaten prosperity and even peace.”); EVA WOLKOWITZ &
SARAH PARKER, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, BIG DATA, BIG POTENTIAL: HARNESSING DATA
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovationfiles/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/13062352/Big-Data-Big-Potential-Harnessing-Data-Technology-forthe-Underserved-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHS-Z39Y]; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016).
3. See generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: FinTech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 790–91 (2019) (arguing that fintech applications may shift the fundamental balance
of the public and private roles in the financial sector, thus increasing systemic risk); Angela Walch, The
Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 855–82 (2015); Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future of Secured
Transactions Law, 3 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 21 (2020); Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2020); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018).
4. For example, fintech platforms can provide credit by using artificial intelligence underwriting
and alternative data. See Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477, 490–
94 (2020).
5. Omarova, supra note 3; see infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
6. Omarova, supra note 3.
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defy private law doctrines and regulatory requirements in ways that are difficult
to undo.7 Each of these attributes of blockchain-based financial markets
aggravates systemic risk.8
Macro-level regulatory concerns presented by emerging platforms for
financial activity implicate financial inclusion and sustainability. If the financial
crisis of 2007–2008 is any guide, systemic financial instability can exacerbate the
wealth gap and ultimately set back groups that, in theory, might have benefitted
from the greater access to credit associated with market expansion. Financial
crises hit those who are struggling harder than those who are wealthy, resulting
in diminished financial inclusion and sustainability.
With respect to some market practices, we can trace a relationship between
systemic risk concerns and efforts at financial inclusion for individual investors.
For example, the expansion of sub-prime mortgage products in the early 2000s
was intended, at least in theory and in part, to create access to credit to purchase
homes for people who could not access this market using more traditional
mortgage products.9 But the secondary market appetite for mortgage-backed
securities and the rapid origination of higher-risk mortgage products had the
effect, when markets failed, of further excluding many homeowners whose
attempts at financial inclusion resulted in foreclosure.
While individual investor-orientated transactions enabled by blockchain that
rely on secondary market capital do exist, this Article is not about the connection
between products designed to increase inclusion but that also contribute to
systemic risk. Rather, it is about how blockchain-based transactions can
aggravate systemic risk, and the phenomenon that economic downturns caused
by excessive systemic risk erode financial inclusion and sustainability. For
example, Christopher Odinet has observed that consumer and small businessoriented fintech lending services rely on securitization of these loans (that are
underwritten with algorithms) to access capital.10 This market activity directly
links the creation of complex, fintech-based financial products to financial
services associated with inclusion. But other fintech market practices are not

7. See Hughes, supra note 3 (discussing self-executing transactions and private-law norms); Allen,
supra note 3 (discussing self-executing transactions, algorithmic complexity, and regulatory
requirements). Blockchain-based market activity also brings operational risk inherent in software and
decentralization (depending on whether the blockchain is permissioned and how it is administered). See
Walch, supra note 3.
8. See infra Part II.
9. For example, the George W. Bush administration made explicit the policy objective of
increasing rates of home ownership among minorities. Subprime mortgage lending enables access to
credit and is superior in most instances to sale-leaseback or installment sale alternatives to traditional
mortgage lending. Subprime lending did not necessitate increased predatory lending, the development
of excessively complex financial products, or sloppy underwriting practices. Yet many home buyers
ended up in foreclosure for a mix of reasons including misleading lending practices, loss of value to their
homes due to overall market decline, lack of understanding of loan terms, or changed circumstances. See
generally, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 83–213 (2011),
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE52-NPNX].
10. Odinet, supra note 4.
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necessarily linked directly to expanding retail products or individual investing.
Regardless, the consequences of a failure of a systemically significant financial
institution, or of widespread market failure, do affect individuals and can
undermine financial inclusion and sustainability.
Policy makers have been considering for some years now how regulation can
provide adequate consumer and investor protection in the context of emerging
fintech platforms without stifling the potential for innovation and financial
inclusion. Financial regulation to address systemic risk—the soundness of
systemically significant financial institutions and the like—is often thought of as
a field apart from investor protection regulation to mitigate risks to consumers
and small businesses using emerging platforms. But both implicate the question
of whether and how emerging financial technologies will affect financial inclusion
and financial sustainability.11
Part II of this Article describes a specific fintech development: blockchainbased financial transactions, or smart contracts for trade transactions executed
on a distributed ledger. This Part describes what is new about this emerging
financial technology that warrants heightened vigilance from a regulatory
perspective and how this technology aggravates systemic risk. Part III assesses
the relationship between systemic risk and financial inclusion. The potential for
blockchain technology to expand financial inclusion is tremendous, but the
macro-level financial concerns that this technology presents have complex
implications for financial inclusion and sustainability. Part IV discusses
regulation of market activity on emerging platforms, focusing on the importance
of private-law rules. Private-law doctrines and concepts contribute to systemic
stability in important ways that policymakers sometimes overlook.12 For
example, the limitations on freedom of contract imposed by the property concept
of numerus clausus13 prevent market actors from circumventing various
regulatory requirements.14 Blockchain-based smart contracts can conflate
contract and property-law functions and can make security interests and entities
indistinguishable.15 How do we ensure that private-law norms that contribute to
11. In addition, these fields are linked in contexts where practices like securitization involve
consumer or small business loans. See Odinet, supra note 4 at 485 (showing “how fintech is causing a
major convergence between policies associated with consumer protection (licensing, disclosures, fairness,
etc.) on the one hand and those dealing with commercial and corporate finance (i.e., the capital markets,
risk, and failure) on the other”); Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer
Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 4 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV., 435, 436 (2009) (observing the oftenoverlooked connection between “regulations designed to protect consumers and regulations intended to
protect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions”).
12. See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law, 20
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 179, 210–19 (2015) [hereinafter Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard,
and the Private Law].
13. Numerus clausus is the principle that the law will only enforce an interest as a property right—
rather than a contract right—if it conforms to a limited number of generally accepted and standardized
forms. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 64–67.
14. Hughes, supra note 12, at 211–16.
15. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 17–23.
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systemic stability persist in fintech-enabled markets? How do we establish a
functional relationship between private market activity and collective welfare?
How we approach these broad, normative questions will determine whether
fintech developments yield greater financial inclusion and sustainability, or the
potential for worsening inequality and instability.
II
FINTECH AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES
The term fintech refers generally to technologies for financial services and
transactions and includes a variety of platforms and developments.
Developments in technology have at numerous junctures impacted financial
transactions and services. As legal scholars Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav
state, contemporary fintech departs from past developments in that it “generally
(i) relies on the use of big data; (ii) involves complex algorithms and artificial
intelligence; and (iii) showcases a tendency to seek out disintermediation in
traditional financial services and supply chains by a nontraditional set of firms.”16
This Article will focus primarily on one emerging financial technology: the
use of blockchain-based smart contracts for financial transactions. Blockchain
and smart contracts are distinct technologies that can function apart from each
other. It is the use of blockchain platforms for the expression and execution of
smart contracts that presents wide-ranging possibilities for financial markets. It
is this financial technology that promises lower-cost, faster settlements in
financial markets—offering the potential for lower costs of capital that can foster
financial inclusion but also the potential for aggravated systemic risk.
A blockchain is a distributed ledger that records transactions.17 When a ledger
is distributed, it means that there is no master copy: any participant may maintain
a copy of the ledger and yet all participants have confidence that theirs matches
all other copies.18 Participants can trust the accuracy of a ledger without reference
to a master copy or central authority; this is the innovation of blockchain
16. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019),
at n.18.
17. All blockchains are distributed ledgers, but not all distributed ledgers fit neatly into the category
“blockchain.” The Corda system for transactions among regulated financial institutions, for example, is
a distributed ledger that uses a data structure that is distinct from a blockchain. See Richard Gendal
Brown, Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial Services, GENDAL.ME
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-forfinancial-services [https://perma.cc/674Y-D4ZW]. Despite its distinct data structure, commentators call
the R3 financial services consortium a “blockchain firm” and include it in the discussions of blockchain
technology. Walch notes that some have called expansive uses of the term blockchain “chainwashing”—
using the word “blockchain” because of its market hype in contexts where “distributed ledger” would be
more accurate. See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 713, 727 (2017). A member of the R3 consortium has called out this “chainwashing” in contexts
where companies either do not actually use blockchain technology, or do not need to use it to best serve
their customers. See id.; Tim Swanson, Chainwashing, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/02/13/chainwashing [https://perma.cc/7CFB-Z9U7].
18. Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKLEY TECH. L.J.
488, 500 (2018).
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technology. People commonly refer to blockchain technology, blockchains, or the
blockchain.19 Or, they refer to distributed ledger technology (DLT), or shared
ledgers or consensus ledgers.20 Some commentators assert that the term
blockchain should refer only to public or permissionless ledgers, while others use
blockchain to mean any distributed ledger—open access or permissioned.21 All
blockchains are constituted by (i) a ledger,22 (ii) a network,23 and (iii) consensus,24
that is (iv) unalterable by feasible means.25 This Article uses the term blockchain
to refer to any platform constituted by these essential elements, regardless of
whether is it permissioned or fully decentralized.
Smart contracts are agreements that are self-executing and self-enforcing,
expressed in code.26 Different forms of blockchain-based smart contract
19. While currently there are numerous blockchains in operation, it is possible that in the future
there will be only one blockchain of consequence. Id., at 501. When commentators use “the blockchain,”
in some contexts it seems they are assuming such an outcome and referring to “the blockchain” as we
refer to “the Internet.” In other contexts, “the blockchain” means the Bitcoin blockchain specifically,
since Bitcoin is the dominant platform. Werbach notes: “Bitcoin today remains the biggest platform in
terms of market capitalization of tokens, but its dominance appears to be waning. In twenty years, it
could be worth several trillion dollars, or zero.” Id.
20. People use the word “blockchain” inconsistently, making the terminology surrounding this
technology highly confusing. See Walch, supra note 17, at 718 (describing the inconsistent and misleading
vocabulary surrounding blockchain and how the resulting confusion can affect regulation). The terms
blockchain and distributed ledger are not necessarily interchangeable. Commentators refer to a
“consensus ledger” as a ledger that does not keep track of a history of transactions but rather operates
according to a consensus generated on a ledger of accounts that is updated with new transactions at each
validation round. See id. at 719–20; Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, Distributed Ledger Technology
in Securities post-Trading, 9 (European Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper No. 172, Apr. 2016), https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop172.en.pdf; Sebastien Meunier, Blockchain Technology—a
Very Special Kind of Distributed Database, MEDIUM (Dec. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/@sbmeunier/
blockchain-technology-a-very-special-kind-of-distributed-database-e63d00781118
[https://perma.cc/
AN44-3KBU] (describing the iterations of distributed ledger technology, including blockchain).
21. Walch, supra note 17, at 725.
22. “The ledger is the database that expands as it incorporates approved transactions. Transactions
are added to the ledger using cryptographic signatures and keys, and they are grouped into blocks. Each
block contains a cryptographic hash to the previous block, keeping the blocks in order.” Hughes, supra
note 3, at 31.
23. “The network is the computer nodes running the software for the application—for example, the
nodes running the Bitcoin software, connected in a peer-to-peer network—where each node maintains a
complete copy of the blockchain. Each new transaction is broadcast to all nodes in the network. The
nodes add new blocks to the blockchain as transactions are validated.” Id. at 32.
24. Consensus is how blockchains establish trust among untrustworthy participants in the absence
of a centralized authority or enforcement mechanism. On the Bitcoin network, for example, consensus is
generated with a process called mining. This consensus mechanism first executed by the Bitcoin
blockchain is commonly called “proof-of-work,” or creating consensus with a “proof-of-work algorithm.”
Many permissionless and some permissioned blockchains rely on proof-of-work algorithms. These
require considerable computing power (and energy) for their administration. Permissioned blockchains
may use a consensus mechanism other than proof-of-work. Hyperledger Fabric, for example, provides a
number of consensus algorithms available to participants who use a Hyperledger platform. The difficulty
of these algorithms, and the computational power they demand, varies. See id. at 32–33.
25. No one can alter a transaction once it is approved because the blocks are linked in a sequence
that cannot be feasibly altered. See id. at 31.
26. See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts ex Machina, 67 Duke L.J. 313, 313 n.2, 319–20
(2017). There are other definitions of smart contracts. Max Raskin defines them as “agreements wherein
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accomplish different ends. The smart contracts that this Article focuses on are
single smart contracts for trade transactions, executed on a decentralized ledger.
They reflect a “decentralized bond between two or more parties on the
blockchain,” that operates in response to financial incentives.27
Blockchain-based smart contracts, as a platform for financial markets, can
compound risks to market stability. In recent scholarship Saule Omarova
identifies a prevailing narrative around fintech: that it makes transactions easier
and cheaper, through applied information science, in a normatively neutral way.28
She challenges this narrative, asserting that fintech is a macro-level phenomenon
with normative and political implications. In a similar vein, Hilary Allen
identifies macro-level regulatory concerns surrounding fintech and discusses the
importance of ethics in the administration of tech-driven markets.29
Omarova states that fintech is poised to be “the catalyst for a potentially
decisive shift in the underlying public-private balance of powers, competencies,
and roles in the financial system.”30 This underlying balance of powers in the U.S.
financial system has been formed, over time, in terms of what Omarova calls the
“New Deal settlement”: a system of financial sector regulation that took shape
during the New Deal era and the essential premises of which have been replicated
and perpetuated in sophisticated regulatory infrastructure for systematic
oversight of financial markets.31 The New Deal settlement embodies normative
judgments about the correct balance between private freedom and public control
in financial markets:
[P]rivate market actors retain control over substantive decisions on how to allocate
financial capital to various productive uses—and thus the power to determine the
overall volume and structure of financial claims in the system. The public . . . bears the
primary responsibility for maintaining the overall stability of the financial system . . . .

execution is automated, usually by computers.” Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts,
1 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 305, 306 (2017). Jeremy Sklaroff states that “[s]mart contracts are decentralized
agreements built in computer code and stored on a blockchain.” Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart
Contracts and The Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 263 (2017). See also Ai Deng, Smart
Contracts and Blockchains: Steroid for Collusion? 1 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3187010
[https://perma.cc/4T44-7VSP]; Christopher D. Clack Vikram A. Bakshi & Lee Braine, Smart Contract
Templates: Foundations, Design Landscape and Research Directions 2 (Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf (“A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable
agreement. Automatable by computer, although some parts may require human input and control.
Enforceable by either legal enforcement of rights and obligations or tamper-proof execution.”);
Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract
Law 7 (Nat’l Res. U. Higher Sch. of Econs., Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2885241 [https://perma.cc/M84X-UD42] (“Smart contract is an agreement whose execution is
automated.”).
27. JP Buntinx, What is a DApp?, MERKLE, https://themerkle.com/what-is-a-dapp [https://perma.cc/
DV9G-P8GJ] (last updated Jan. 19, 2017).
28. Omarova, supra note 3.
29. See generally Allen, supra note 3, at 174–95, 202 (discussing various “potential threats to
financial stability” from algorithmic finance, including ethical concerns surrounding artificial intelligence
and machine learning).
30. Omarova, supra note 3 at 735.
31. See id. at 746–54.
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[R]egulation constrains market participants’ ability to generate excessive system-wide
risks in pursuit of private profits.32

This New Deal settlement embodies a contestable, unstable boundary between
public and private that has been continuously renegotiated as market actors press
for expanded freedoms to create and trade financial claims.
The fact that the financial system’s center of gravity has shifted from primary
to secondary markets, coupled with excessive risk generation and untethered
growth within secondary markets, has undermined the New Deal settlement.33
The advent of blockchain-based platforms for financial markets threatens to
further diminish it, leaving no sense of how, in the future, we will achieve a
functional balance of private risk-taking and public welfare.34 This is because
blockchain-based platforms enable increasingly complex “pooling and layering
of claims, and acceleration and compression of trades”—the mechanisms with
which market actors achieve continuous synthesizing of tradable financial assets
and increasing volume and speed of trading activity.35 In the face of proliferating
private market activity of this nature, the public side of the New Deal settlement
is increasingly challenged to accommodate privately created claims while
managing systemic risks. Given this dynamic, Omarova argues, fintech—with its
macro-level financial implications—presents a “public policy challenge of the
highest order.”36
In addition to risk associated with increased synthesizing of claims and scaling
up of trading activity, blockchain-based smart contracts aggravate systemic risk
by detaching financial transactions from private law rules and norms that
integrate important policy choices into market activity.37 Blockchain-based
transactions may defy private law doctrines in ways that are difficult to undo.38
Blockchain-based smart contracts are a device for transacting, not a type of
transaction. But this device has a legal effect in that it dedicates assets to specific
transactional counterparties—it accomplishes asset partitioning.39 Regulators
and policymakers tend to treat this technology as a new platform for executing
established forms of transactions. But blockchain-based smart contracts can be
difficult to fit into existing legal frameworks because their functionality conflates
contract and property law devices, and mimics both security interests and
entities.40 As such, emerging platforms enable market actors to exploit the
difficulty of challenging a transaction’s characterization, enabling them to sidestep statutory boundaries that reflect longstanding political choices.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 740.
See id. at 756–59.
See id. at 790–92.
Id. at 741; see generally Allen, supra note 3.
Omarova, supra note 3 at 743.
See Hughes, supra note at 3, at 3.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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For example, it may be possible for a fintech-enabled transaction to assign
assets to a special purpose entity for purposes of securitization with a high degree
of recourse that, if subject to a characterization challenge, would make the assets
reachable by the originator’s creditors. In the traditional or low-tech world,
creditors—potentially employees, suppliers, or tort claimants—would have,
through the bankruptcy process, a legal point of intervention at which to
challenge the true-sale status of an assignment for the issuance of asset-backed
securities. In a fintech-enabled transaction, however, there may be no such legal
intervention point. The code expressing the transaction may be written to
automatically transfer assets to the investors in asset-backed securities upon the
occurrence of an originator bankruptcy. The originator may try to contest and
eventually undo the disposition, but there is no possibility of an order permitting
access to the assets pending the determination of their status in private-law
terms.41
The narrative around legal treatment of blockchain-based smart contracts
implies that existing legal infrastructure can accommodate this market activity so
long as laws are sufficiently technology neutral. As Omarova observes, the
fintech narrative focuses on concrete, transactional aspects of finance and how
fintech can provide micro-level “win-wins” within the financial system.42 But
fintech is introducing new mechanisms for executing transactions—more quickly
and securely—that the law will recognize and interpret. This narrative obscures
the complexity of applying established legal doctrines to transactions which can
(i) defy straightforward legal characterization, and (ii) force transacting parties
to contest outcomes only after execution, in a remedial posture.43 The cumulative
effect of this complexity could be markets that expand despite inconsistent or
incoherent legal status, undermining the capacity to administer, in the future,
rules designed to curtail problematic risks and externalities.44
In other words, disregard of private-law rules invites systemic risk. Investors
in mortgage-backed securities suffered, surrounding the 2007-2008 crisis, from
uncertainty regarding the legal status of assets collateralizing issuances.45 For
another example, the market prominence of securities repurchase agreements or
“repos” led lawmakers to define these agreements as sales despite the fact that
they function as extensions of credit.46 This sale treatment, based on form and
regardless of economic substance, helped to catalyze a repo run on banks that

41. Cf. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 274 B.R. 278, 285–86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (rejecting a
creditor’s motion for relief from an interim order permitting originator access to securitized accounts
receivable).
42. Omarova, supra note 3.
43. See Hughes, supra note 3.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 57.
46. See id. at 58.
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scholars identify as a central cause of the financial crisis.47 If lawmakers decline
to articulate how blockchain-based transactions implicate contract, property, and
entity laws before these transactions become dominant and entrenched, markets
could defy regulators’ ability to enforce well-established legal norms.
III
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
The relationship between systemic risk, fintech, and financial inclusion is
complex. The very real prospects for increasing access to financial services and
credit for individuals, and access to capital for small businesses, are exciting.48
This is especially true from a global perspective. But fintech may have ominous
repercussions49 for financial inclusion if lawmakers do not take seriously the
macro-level policy questions surrounding financial regulation, and the questions
surrounding legal treatment of technology-enabled transactions, that emerging
platforms for financial markets present. If the last financial crisis is any guide,
excessive systemic risk and resulting market failures undermine financial
inclusion and sustainability. They most hurt those striving for financial stability
and upward mobility.
Older fintech developments—like the software that enables securitization,
tranches, et cetera—were applied in contexts involving policy choices made
expressly with financial inclusion in mind (that is, the sub-prime mortgage
market).50 But the systemic risk and market failure that resulted had the effect of
exacerbating the wealth gap and undermining financial inclusion and
sustainability.
With respect to new fintech developments—such as AI-based underwriting
of loans—the promise of expanding access to credit by looking beyond traditional
credit score and income information holds promise for financial inclusion. These
kinds of loans are funded by capital markets and, because underwriting is
accomplished with AI and algorithms, they are obtuse.51 It is very difficult for a
purchaser of securities to assess or have any insight into the underwriting criteria
for the loans backing the securities.52 In the event that securitization of fintech-

47. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON.
425, 447–48 (2012) (hypothesizing that the bankruptcy safe harbor for repo transactions aggravated the
economic downturn).
48. See Odinet, supra note 4.
49. Others have focused on the problematic implications of fintech for financial inclusion as a
function of discrimination by algorithms coded with or resulting in bias. See supra note 2. Here, the
concern is distributional effects of market failures due to fintech-based financial activity.
50. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
51. See Odinet, supra note 4 at 490.
52. See id. at 514 (explaining the difficulty of comprehending the underwriting done with AI because
of the complexity of the data).
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based loans expands, the risk that the opacity and complexity of these loans
present could contribute to systemic risk.53
The systemic risks that can threaten financial inclusion and sustainability are
not limited to cases in which financial products derive from access-oriented
lending activity. This Article concerns systemic risk generally—as related to any
technology-enabled lowering of costs of capital by synthesizing claims or by
eliminating characterization challenges. The concern is that the fall-out of
excessive systemic risk hits harder people who are struggling for access to credit
or capital for small businesses.
The point, here, is not to contemplate a trade-off between access-enabling
fintech developments and increased risk to lower income people associated with
the possibility of widespread economic downturn. Rather, it is to illustrate the
multi-faceted implications of fintech for financial inclusion and sustainability.
IV
LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS
At the heart of this inquiry into the implications of fintech for financial
inclusion and sustainability is the question of how we conceive of the relationship
between law and markets. Omarova speaks of a public and private dynamic in
which private market actors generate financial claims and public agencies
monitor and control for excessive risks. My own work casts the private law as the
legal infrastructure of markets, without which there would be no enforceable
claims to trade.54
Referring to financial market dynamics surrounding the pooling and layering
of financial assets and acceleration and compression of financial transactions,
Omarova warns: “If (or when?) fintech delivers on its promise to make these
mechanisms virtually frictionless, thus taking their operation to a qualitatively
different level, the financial market will completely forsake the frail confines of
the New Deal settlement. We need to start thinking seriously about what should
replace it.”55 Erosion of the New Deal settlement implies a waning capacity of
regulatory agencies to monitor and control private market actors. In response,
53. See id. at 515 (discussing how acceptance of AI underwriting, without understanding it, will
increase risk).
54. See generally Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private
Law, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 179 (2015) (articulating a shift from a contract-law to a property-law
framework for regulating transactional complexity after the financial crisis); Heather Hughes, Reforming
the True-Sale Doctrine, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN 51, (2018) [hereinafter, Reforming the True-Sale
Doctrine] (arguing that state lawmakers should reform true-sale rules to include price in the analysis);
Heather Hughes, Property and the True-Sale Doctrine, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 870 (2017) [hereinafter
Property and the True-Sale Doctrine] (mapping arguments about the efficiency of securitization to
varying formulations of the true-sale doctrine).
55. New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 3, at 793. She has begun to answer her own call in a series of
articles, on her own and with Bob Hockett. The task of thinking seriously about what will replace the
public/ private boundaries in a fintech-driven, post New Deal settlement world requires taking up deep
normative questions about what kinds of finance there should be, and what finance and financial systems
should do in a republic.
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Omarova and others tend to focus on fortifying or re-configuring federal
regulatory bodies and regulatory strategies.56
But in thinking seriously about what should replace the New Deal settlement,
we should not overlook the regulatory potential of state laws, especially the
common law and commercial laws. Lawmakers should not be afraid to define
new technology-enabled market practices and asset classes in private-law terms.
While legal concepts will need to evolve to accommodate new practices, leaving
technologies of legal import beyond private-law classification altogether invites
a lack of clarity and a problematic dissonance between legal infrastructure and
market practices. Once certain financial products or practices become too big to
fail,57 they may defy proper regulatory treatment despite excessive risks.58 This
Article offers one example of private-law rules that transactions executed using
blockchain-based smart contracts could thwart, with wide-ranging consequences:
the rules expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 governing
secured transactions.
“Agreements that market actors do not currently associate with UCC Article
9, when expressed as smart contracts, behave like secured transactions.”59 For
example, if a liquidated damages clause in a services contract becomes selfexecuting, then the contract partitions assets to satisfy obligations. “Code-based,
self-executing mechanisms arguably bring any agreement that utilizes them
within the UCC’s statutory parameters for security interests.”60 At the same time,
blockchain-based smart contracts can create a “functional convergence of
security interests and entities.”61 “If blockchain-based smart contracts partition
assets in ways that are difficult to classify, market actors may proceed on the
grounds that transactions on a blockchain avoid secured transactions law all
together.”62
Secured transactions law expresses numerous policy choices relevant to the
curtailment of systemic risk. Consider, for example, UCC Article 9’s various rules
regarding notice and requiring the reasonable disposition of assets upon default.
If entire markets can use fintech to side-step the UCC’s notice requirements and
commercial reasonableness standards for disposition of assets, then fintech can
undermine longstanding policy choices of political significance. How would such
a development impact systemic risk?
A joint study group of the American Law Institute (ALI) and Uniform Law
Commission (ULC) has been meeting to evaluate the UCC and emerging
56. Id.
57. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553,1633 (2008) (explaining how courts and lawmakers decline to
enforce legal doctrines that threaten dominant market practices when doing so would cause upheaval.)
58. See id.; Allen, supra note 3 (arguing that regulators should be involved with algorithmic
automation now, while they can still have influence).
59. Blockchain and the Future of Secured Transactions Law, supra note 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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technologies. This ALI and ULC effort proceeds with the posture of assessing
whether the UCC is sufficiently technology neutral. The statute is sufficiently
technology neutral if current rules can accommodate and do not conflict with
emerging technology-enabled transactions and practices. The group engages
normative questions about the desirability of intermediation, or about the
meaning and purpose of perfection of a security interest, for example. But the
group, given time constraints and the number of issues to address, does not
necessarily engage the type of normative, values-driven assessment of law and
fintech that legal scholars are calling for. Ensuring that the UCC does not impede
or fail to accommodate emerging technologies is an important step. Waiting for
market practices to evolve before taking on more difficult and conceptual
questions, however, runs the risk that market practices will depart from legal
norms in an irretrievable way.63
A decade ago, in the wake of the last financial crisis, scholars observed that
levels of complexity that can exacerbate moral hazard and financial instability
indicate a disregard for foundational property-law principles.64 If financial
transactions are creatures of contract alone, then nothing prevents contracting to
oblivion: creating more and more complex and compounded claims. Contracts
may be infinitely complex and obtuse, as they are enforceable only by and against
parties in privity of contract with one another. Property rights, in contrast, are
enforceable against third parties. As such, numerus clausus is a feature of
property law systems around the world.65 This concept—”the number is
closed”—refers to how property law will only enforce interests in property that
take an established, recognizable form.66 Market actors cannot make up new
forms of property by contract. If they could, they would contract around
bankruptcy rules, foreclosure protections, and tax obligations. The scope of a
property interest is determined by law, based on the intent of the parties as
evidenced by the economic substance of the deal.67
It is an example of numerus clausus when a court characterizes a conveyance
as an assignment of a security interest rather than an outright sale. For another
example, consider the various, established forms of business entities recognized
by statute in each state. Scholars have argued for regulation to standardize
financial products, such as, for example, permitting issuance of new products with
a “conform or explain” approach.68 This would help preserve the capacity of
secondary markets to assess and value—and therefore trade—claims more
readily when markets are volatile.

63. See id.; Allen, supra note 3, at 195 (arguing that waiting for proof of risks before addressing them
through policy can be very costly).
64. See Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law, supra note 12, at 4.
65. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 13.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Property and the True-Sale Doctrine, supra note 54, at 148.
68. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries¸ 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961,
2030 (2010) (describing the benefits of the “conform or explain” approach).
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Now, consider the implications for market complexity of a transacting
platform—blockchain-enabled smart contracts—that expresses contractual
obligations enforceable against third parties. This type of fintech platform
presents a challenge. If the functions of contract and property law converge, how
do we sustain the dynamic between freedom of contract and the formalities of
property law that is integral to the legal administration of markets? Tasking
various federal regulatory bodies with policing outcomes in blockchain-based
financial markets, to preserve financial stability, may be crucial. But it is also
crucial to watch and digest how private-law concepts operate on emerging
platforms and to tend to the state statues and common law doctrines on which
market expectations rely.
V
CONCLUSION
To the extent lawmakers wish to preserve existing policy choices, and to forge
a functional public and private dynamic surrounding financial markets, they must
be willing to engage with fintech as a phenomenon that presents normative
questions. To the extent we wish to foster financial inclusion and sustainability,
we must think critically about how to harness the best of fintech for the provision
of banking services and access to credit, while protecting against its challenges to
financial systems.

